The US is putting full pressure on Lula against factions
- José Adauto Ribeiro da Cruz
- há 6 horas
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Adauto Jornalismo Policial* with AI Copilot support provided by Microsoft e canal @canalmilitarizandoomundo
The massive police operation carried out on Tuesday in the Penha and Alemão complexes, in the northern zone of Rio de Janeiro, targeting the Red Command — one-of-Brazil’s-largest-criminal-factions — reignited the international debate on combating organized crime in the country. Named Operation Containment, the action mobilized around twenty-five hundred Civil and Military police officers, resulting in the arrest of more than eighty individuals, the seizure of over seventy rifles, two hundred kilograms of drugs, and other equipment.
The episode not only exposed Brazil’s urban violence but also intensified pressure from the United States government on President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to classify factions such as the Red Command and the First Capital Command as terrorist organizations. The operation, considered the deadliest in Rio de Janeiro’s history, even surpassed the Jacarezinho massacre of twenty twenty-one. It occurred amid the territorial expansion of the Red Command, which controls vast areas in the capital and other states. Residents reported scenes of horror. More than sixty bodies were recovered from the forests of Serra da Misericórdia and taken to São Lucas Square.
The state government, led by Cláudio Castro, hailed the action as a success against narco-terrorists, but critics pointed to human rights violations, with reports of summary executions and police acting with hatred. The Rio Forensic Institute was closed exclusively to handle the demand, and the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office demanded urgent explanations from the governor.
While Brazil deals with internal consequences such as school closures, transportation shutdowns, and a war zone in the region, the United States sees the episode as an opportunity to reinforce its anti-terrorism agenda in Latin America. Under Donald Trump’s administration, the U.S. had already been pressuring Brazil since May twenty twenty-five, when a delegation led by David Gamell, acting head of sanctions at the State Department, visited Brasília to propose classifying the PCC and Red Command as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
The proposal was rejected by Lula’s government, which argued that the factions do not meet the criteria of Brazil’s anti-terrorism law, as their actions are profit-driven rather than politically or religiously motivated. Justice Minister Ricardo Lewandowski reiterated that equating organized crime with terrorism could financially isolate Brazil on the global stage, turning the country into a pariah in international negotiations.
U.S. pressure gained new momentum after the Rio operation. Diplomatic sources indicate that the Americans, already closely connected to Brazil through intelligence cooperation and consular presence, are closely monitoring the expansion of these factions into U.S. territory. The FBI identified activities of the PCC and Red Command in at least twelve U.S. states, including New York, Florida, and New Jersey, where Brazilian immigrants are used to launder drug money.
This geographic and operational proximity has led the U.S. to adopt drastic measures against narco-terrorists in countries neighboring Brazil, raising the alert at the Palácio do Planalto. Recently, the U.S. intensified military strikes against targets in Venezuela, which Trump classified as a narco-state under Nicolás Maduro’s regime. In October twenty twenty-five, the U.S. conducted a series of air and naval strikes against vessels suspected of drug trafficking in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean, near the Venezuelan coast.
On October third, a strike killed four people aboard a vessel allegedly involved in drug trafficking. On October fourteenth, another strike eliminated six individuals on a similar boat. More recently, on October twenty-eighth, the U.S. announced strikes against four vessels in the Eastern Pacific, killing fourteen alleged terrorists. Secretary of War Pete Heget confirmed the actions in posts on X, stating they aim to disrupt the drug flow into the United States.
These operations put President Lula on red alert, according to sources close to the government, as they represent an escalation of Trump’s doctrine of treating cartels as terrorists, setting precedents for unilateral interventions. Colombia, another strategic neighbor, is also coming under U.S. scrutiny. Although no strikes have been confirmed on Colombian territory so far, the Trump administration has considered plans to attack cocaine production facilities in Venezuela and potentially extend operations to trafficking routes involving Colombia.
Reports indicate that the U.S. views Colombia as a weak link in the drug trafficking chain, especially after normalizing relations with guerrilla groups under President Gustavo Petro’s government, which could justify actions under the pretext of combating narco-terrorism. Analysts warn that this strategy is more spectacle than sustainable tactic, but it sets a dangerous precedent for the region.
In Brazil’s case, the situation is complicated by the fact that around eight months ago, in February twenty twenty-five, the Rio state government delivered a detailed report to the U.S. consulate in Rio, prepared by the Public Security Secretariat’s intelligence division. The document classifies the Red Command as a terrorist organization, highlighting its expansion into the U.S. and violent acts in Brazil such as road blockades and attacks on civilians. The goal was to expand bilateral cooperation and seek sanctions from the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control against faction leaders.
This initiative, aligned with Trump’s vision, contrasts with the federal stance and increases the perception that the Brazilian government is weak in combating factions, potentially paving the way for more direct U.S. intervention. International relations experts, such as Harvard professor John D (a fictitious name for anonymity), argue that if Brazil does not intensify internal pressure through integrated federal operations and social policies to dismantle faction control over vast areas, the U.S. will certainly consider military interventions.
The Americans have already normalized maritime strikes against narco-terrorists, and the next step could be ground actions in Latin America — especially if Brazil is seen as a sanctuary for these groups. The rejection of federal support requests, such as federal prison vacancies or activation of the Law and Order Guarantee by Castro, reinforces this narrative of fragility.
Moreover, there is growing criticism of the federal government’s stance. While it seems difficult to criticize traffickers with speeches that emphasize the social context of crime without explicit condemnation, little empathy is shown when police officers die in confrontations. In the Rio operation, four agents were killed, including two from the Special Operations Battalion. Yet the official focus has been on investigating police abuses, which opponents — such as the sons of former president Jair Bolsonaro — use to accuse Lula of protecting criminals.
With the U.S. sinking Venezuelan vessels and expanding its war on narco-terrorism, Brazil finds itself at a diplomatic crossroads. Lula is expected to meet with Chief of Staff Minister Rui Costa later this Wednesday, October twenty-ninth, to discuss the crisis in Rio and possible federal responses. Meanwhile, the international community watches closely: a U.S. intervention in Brazil would be a geopolitical earthquake, violating treaties such as those of the UN and Mercosur’s Treaty of Asunción.
But the regional escalation suggests that Trump will not hesitate to prioritize American national security. The future of organized crime combat in Brazil may depend on how firmly Lula’s government resists or yields to these external pressures.
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